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C h r i s t i n e H a l s e
A n n e H o n e y
Unraveling Ethics: Illuminating the Moral Dilemmas
of Research Ethics
T his essay offers a critical, reflective analysis of some of the sticky moralquestions that can entangle feminist researchers as they work to trans-form a research proposal into an application for ethics committee
approval. We write not as philosophers or ethicists but as feminist social
scientists reflecting on our struggle to do ethical research and to be ethical
researchers in an environment governed by a regulatory model of research
ethics. Our story is constructed as two intersecting narratives. In the first
section of our essay, “A Narrative about Ethics,” we relate our account
of how ethical theory plays out in the real world, drawing on our expe-
rience of preparing the ethics applications for an interview study with
“anorexic” teenage girls and our struggles with two pillars of research
ethics policy: defining the research population and eliciting informed con-
sent.1 In the second section of our essay, “Ethics in Our Narrative,” we
tease out the implications of the research ethics approval process for the
people who participate in research and for those who desire to be ethical
and moral researchers.
The enigmatic, gendered character of self-starvation and the unan-
swered riddle of its cause(s) and maintenance has made anorexia nervosa
an alluring subject for scholars in many disciplines and fields (including
cultural studies, women’s studies, and media studies) using a spectrum of
perspectives (social, cultural, and biological) and epistemologies, from
Preparation of this article was supported by a research grant from the Australian Research
Council, the Centre for Digestive Diseases, and the Children’s Hospital Education Research
Institute in Sydney, Australia. We would like to thank Desiree Boughtwood, Peter Bansell,
Bronwyn Davies, and Anne Gearside for their helpful comments on various drafts of this
article. We are also grateful for the insightful suggestions from the two reviewers who read
an early version of the article.
1 A major point in our essay is that anorexia is a contested category and anorexic is a
problematic label, particularly from girls’ standpoints. For this reason we are using the terms
anorexic and anorexia provisionally and tentatively, in the absence of better words.
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positivism to critical poststructuralism. Amid this enormous corpus of
published research there is a deafening silence about the ethics of doing
research with “sufferers” in general or with teenage girls—the most fre-
quently affected group—in particular.
Our essay seeks to address this glaring gap in the literature while also
responding to the invocations from other researchers for empirical data
and concrete documentation of the practice and implications of ethical
decision making in human research: “the way ethical decisions are actually
reached (as opposed to how they should be reached)” (DeVries and Subedi
1998, v).
Our essay also arises from particular, personal agendas: our desire to
“do ethics right,” in terms of both complying with institutional ethics
policy and being morally and ethically responsible to our research partic-
ipants; our professional commitment to being critically reflexive about the
morality of our interactions with research participants and the research
ethics process; and a vested interest by one of us, as the chair of an
institutional ethics review board, to see research ethics policy and ethics
committees foster genuinely moral behavior and ethical research rather
than cultivating cultures of counterfeit practice.
In penning this essay, our aim is to make visible, and therefore revisable,
the moral dilemmas embedded in research ethics policy and its imple-
mentation by ethics committees, and to illuminate some of the implica-
tions these dilemmas carry for feminist research and feminist researchers.
Michel Foucault ([1973] 1978) points out that even uttering knowledge
that diverges from established discourses is a critical activity and an act of
resistance. In this sense our essay is explicitly transgressive because it seeks
to unravel the morality of the ethics approval process and the ethics of
doing research. This is a dangerous but politically necessary conversation.
The investments, dilemmas, and implications of researchers’ ethical de-
cisions and moral choices are usually secreted away, buried, concealed,
and hidden from public scrutiny, thereby crafting an illusion that “good”
research is being done by “good researchers.” However, it is necessary to
make the ethics of research transparent in order to identify the moral
crevices of ethics policy and practice and to develop new and better ways
of doing feminist research and being ethical feminist researchers.
I. A narrative about ethics
Constructing the indefinable subject
Anorexia nervosa is a serious social issue and a potentially life-threatening
problem affecting approximately 0.5 percent of females, primarily teen-
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agers, and approximately one-tenth as many males (American Psychiatric
Association 2000). Treatment for anorexia nervosa is difficult and pro-
longed. Approximately one-third of sufferers still meet diagnostic criteria
five years after initial treatment, and studies report mortality rates of 5–8
percent from starvation or related complications (Polivy and Herman
2002). Even weight-restored anorexics may experience ongoing medical
complications and long-term psychological and social problems that have
a detrimental impact on their quality of life.
Clinicians and reviewers have criticized the absence of research into the
life history and lived experiences of people with eating problems (e.g.,
Leder 1990). A particular gap is the absence of systematic, qualitative
research about the experience of self-starvation from the standpoints of
teenage sufferers. Our study sought to redress this silence and to generate
understandings that might improve prevention and support programs in
schools and in medical contexts.
We were well versed (and well rehearsed) in “getting through ethics”
and had an intimate, insider knowledge about the thinking and machi-
nations of ethics committees, accumulated from years of serving on and
chairing such committees. We began preparing our ethics applications
complacently confident that the task would be painless and pedestrian.
But our interview study posed messy moral quandaries that challenged
our ideas about the meaning of doing ethical research.
As a multisite study, our research project required ethics approval from
several institutional ethics committees. In Australia, where we work, the
national guidelines and policies governing research with humans are gen-
erated by the National Health and Medical Research Council (National
Health and Medical Research Council 1999). Institutional compliance is
required by federal law and monitored by the Australian Health Ethics
Committee. Compliance is an employment condition for academics and
a prerequisite for the receipt of national research grants. Typically, insti-
tutional ethics committees follow the national protocols, although local
committees may interpret these differently during the review process. The
protocols parallel those of other English-language countries. They include
an explanation of the aims, rationale, and design of the research; a de-
scription of the target population and the procedures for recruiting par-
ticipants and eliciting informed consent; an explanation of the methods
of data collection and analysis; a statement about the risks and benefits
for participants, and the strategies for dealing with possible physical or
psychological distress; copies of the interview questions/questionnaires;
and a letter to participants summarizing the information in the ethics
application.
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Research ethics policy positions research participants as the “object”
of the research and assumes that these “subjects” form an identifiable,
knowable constituency whose members share particular characteristics that
distinguish them from others. Self-starvation resists such comfortable cat-
egorization. Anorexia nervosa is classified as a psychiatric disorder, but
both physical and psychological criteria are used in diagnoses, including
the maintenance of a very low body weight (less than 85 percent of
“normal” for age and height), amenorrhea, fear of fatness, and distorted
body image (American Psychiatric Association 2000). But self-starvation
has shifting, multiple identities and assumes different guises at different
times, ranging from continued noneating to restricted eating with exces-
sive, compulsive exercise to erratic food restriction accompanied by binge
eating and purging (Polivy and Herman 2002). Biomedical discourse con-
structs self-starvation as an organic disorder and a disease, but the origins
and causes of anorexia are uncertain and contested. It has been variously
explained as a biological pathology, a genetic predisposition, an affective
disorder, and a cognitive deficit or dysfunction. Psychodynamic and psy-
choanalytical discourses, on the other hand, constitute anorexia as an
outcome of a variety of family problems or as a self-pathology that is
symptomatic of inadequate or unresolved psychosexual and ego devel-
opment (see Malson 1998, 78–83, for a review).
Biomedical and psychological research explicitly constitutes self-star-
vation as an embodied entity and a distinct pathology that is located within
the individual. The behaviors attributed to anorexia are positioned as
abnormal biological and/or psychological problems that mark the an-
orexic as deviant and different from a generalized population of “normal”
teenage girls. Through her constitution as “other,” the anorexic is posi-
tioned as physically and psychologically unable to act in or to protect her
own interests, thereby justifying medical and psychological intervention
to ensure a return to “normal” eating behaviors and constructing anorexia
as the remit of the medical profession.
Despite the social and cultural power of such discourses, self-starvation
has resisted colonization into biomedical and psychological categories.
Many of the pathologies attributed to anorexics, such as erratic, disordered
eating and obsessive concerns with weight and diet, are typical of many
“normal” women; recovered anorexics commonly reject biomedical con-
structions of self-starvation, and many diagnosed anorexics do not identify
as such, refusing diagnostic classification and medical intervention, and
only presenting for treatment when pressured by friends or family. More-
over, much of the research used to construct anorexia as a biological or
psychological problem has been based on quantitative research that has
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been criticized as methodologically flawed, as construing causal relation-
ships from correlation analyses, and for generating research findings that
are inconclusive and/or contradictory (see Malson 1998).
In contrast, narrative therapy and community psychology constitute an-
orexia as existing outside the self and as having a distinct identity and agency
for independent, autonomous action. Interpolating Cartesian mind/body
dualism, it is the anorexia that takes possession and controls the self, ren-
dering the subject powerless in the face of its determined will. The simul-
taneous disembodiment and personification of anorexia removes “the ori-
gins of distress from the interior psychological workings of the individual
person [to] the surrounding environment” (Smail 1994, 6; see also Morgan
1999). In this frame the anorexic is constructed as a victim or a casualty
of an uncontrollable, mightier force that is external to the physical and
psychological self, erasing the stigma of pathology and exonerating sufferers
from the blame attached to the condition.
Feminist scholars shed a different light on self-starvation by illuminating
the multiple and contradictory ways that culture is entwined with anorexia.
The anorexic body is constituted as an expression of social, cultural, po-
litical, and gender anxieties; as a metaphor for contemporary sociocultural
concerns about consumption, personal display, feminist politics, and in-
dividualistic competitiveness; and as a site of cultural and social oppression
(e.g., Bordo 1993; Fallon, Katzman, and Wooley 1994). Drawing on
feminist perspectives, poststructuralist scholars elucidate how everyday dis-
courses of femininity, body, and identity are implicated in a range of social
institutions and discursive practices that conspire to produce women’s
bodies as anorexic bodies (e.g., Malson 1998).
Defining the research population is an act of category construction
with profound intellectual and moral implications. The multiple identities
of self-starvation ignited sticky dilemmas about how we should describe
anorexia nervosa in our ethics application and in the information letter
to participants. Should it be presented as a “real” physical or psychological
condition: a problem, disorder, or illness? Or should it be presented as a
label or rhetorical device that positions young women as abnormal, de-
viant, and in need of treatment when they defy socially constructed notions
of normal, healthy eating behaviors? In the light of the differing consti-
tutions of anorexia, how could we establish a universal category that neatly
defined the participants in our study? Which words should we use to
address a girl whom clinicians classified as anorexic but who rejected the
assignation of any medical or psychological problem and saw the label of
anorexic as a (mis)representation by others? Could we invite her to share
her experience of living with anorexia if she did not believe that she was
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anorexic? We were anxious to adhere to the principle of respect for human
subjects, but we worried about how to name those who volunteered to
participate in our study. To brand a girl anorexic without consent was to
deny her selfhood—one of the very issues the study aimed to address. To
include only those girls who acknowledged their diagnosis would affect
the research by failing to capture the complex spectrum of “anorexic”
experiences.
In part, our problem lay in deciding to listen to the different discourses
and bodies of research about self-starvation. While our own epistemic
faiths might question the merit of some of these, we could dismiss neither
their potential as a source of insight into self-starvation nor the fact that
they might echo the different ways that girls viewed self-starvation and
their “condition.”
To help untangle these quandaries, we sought the advice of the insti-
tutional ethics officers. In Australia, to protect confidentiality and to pre-
vent coercion of ethics committees, face-to-face discussions between re-
searchers and committees are infrequent. Ethics officers are specialists in
research ethics policy whose job is to help researchers “solve” messy prob-
lems before an ethics application is reviewed. The ethics officers were
empathetic and supportive but uncomprehending: “If you can’t label the
population, then the research isn’t possible.”
We intended to recruit from specialized treatment clinics for eating dis-
orders where many girls had already been diagnosed (labeled) anorexic. The
challenge we faced was how to describe the study’s population so that it
accommodated girls’ perspectives and summoned the essential “anorexic”
subject that the ethics officers and research ethics policy urged us to find.
We considered the possibilities. We could privilege girls’ standpoints by
limiting the study to girls who self-identified as anorexic and by excluding
girls who did not accept their diagnosis. Or we could limit the study to
girls diagnosed as anorexic. Option 1 (privileging girls’ perspectives) risked
including girls whose emaciation and eating problems were the result of
another, possibly undiagnosed psychiatric or biological condition and ex-
cluded an important group, namely, girls labeled anorexic who rejected the
designation. Option 2 (a medical diagnosis) meant privileging the cate-
gorization imposed by others (doctors) over girls’ individual views and
experiences. Further, as researchers familiar with clinical settings, we knew
that a medical diagnosis of anorexia nervosa could not create a coherent
category of person. Diagnoses were often inconsistent and changeable—
they rarely met all diagnostic criteria for anorexia nervosa (American Psy-
chiatric Association 2000) and were often revised days or weeks later as
more information unfolded about each sufferer’s personal history. At its
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best, a diagnosis of anorexia nervosa was an informed judgment at a par-
ticular point in time, but it could not guarantee the definitive, homogenous
population that ethics policy and our ethics officers invoked us to find. Both
options censored the particularity of some girls’ experiences, and both re-
quired us to abandon our sensibility and moral responsibility to some po-
tential participants. Both options altered the research focus and our original
aim of illuminating the full range of experiences among all “anorexic” girls.
Dissatisfied with these alternatives, we floated the idea of using multiple
descriptions to address the particularity and diversity of potential partic-
ipants. One ethics officer flatly rejected the idea: “That would mean they’re
different populations. So you’ll need separate ethics applications and ap-
provals for each group.” The other ethics officers were confused and
mystified. They could not see the problem that troubled us. The doctors
had made their diagnoses and issued the decree: “The girls are anorexic.
The fact that some girls don’t agree with their diagnosis doesn’t mean
they’re not anorexic.”
Of course, the easy way forward was to ignore the questions that trou-
bled us. All we had to do was fill in the standard ethics review application,
prepare generic information letters, get the consent forms signed, and
start interviewing. While we struggled to construct a more morally ac-
ceptable description of the population, our research project stalled, our
funders got restless, and our colleagues got fractious. We had secured
highly competitive funding for the research, but this imposed constraints:
a tight timeline, accountability indicators and reports, the delivery of des-
ignated outcomes. Colleagues vented their incomprehension and frustra-
tion at the delay: “What’s the problem? All you have to do is fill in the
forms and do it.” There were no easy answers to our moral tussle, and
we felt caught in Jacques Derrida’s “double bind”: an unsolvable dilemma
where “one can only unbind one of its knots by pulling on the other to
make it tighter” (Derrida 1998, 36).
Such stalemates nurture compliance. Confronted with either abandoning
our anxiety or our study, we opted for a compromise by adopting the
broadest, most inclusive category available: “girls who have received a med-
ical diagnosis of anorexia nervosa.” Our definition satisfied our ethics com-
mittees and enabled the project to proceed—albeit with a less inclusive
population than we had intended—but it left us uneasy and uncomfortable.
Knowing the capriciousness of clinical diagnoses, we worried about the
intellectual and moral dishonesty of defining the study’s population in this
way. We were also conscious that privileging clinical diagnoses over girls’
views and accounts affirmed and thereby invisibly reinforced the hegemony
of biomedical discourses that construct self-starvation as “other.” Our po-
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sitioning as actively complicit in perpetuating this story undermined our
ethical and moral responsibility to our participants and had troubling moral
implications for our desired identities as ethical, feminist researchers, al-
though—ironically—the ethics committees with whom we worked did not
share our concerns. We hoped the processes for eliciting consent might
compensate for the moral difficulties raised by our definition of the pop-
ulation, but informed consent carried its own moral difficulties.
Speaking the unspeakable: The unknowability of informed consent
Informed consent is a central canon of research ethics policy. The concept
of informed consent assumes the transparency of a social and psychological
reality that enables researchers to provide full and accurate information
about the research to autonomous subjects who are able to make rational,
informed choices. In Australia, the national protocol for informed consent
involves giving participants (usually through an information letter) full,
comprehensive, and accurate details about the research, including the
demands, risks, inconveniences, discomforts, and benefits that might be
involved. As we prepared our ethics application, complexities emerged
about each of the four dimensions of informed consent, namely, the pro-
vision of full information about data collection, voluntarism and coercion,
physical/psychological distress, and competence to understand and par-
ticipate in the research.
Our study involved semistructured life-history interviews that sought
to illuminate the ways that self-starvation shaped participants’ lives, re-
lationships, and subjectivity. To comply with the ethics policy requirement
to provide full information, we dutifully prepared a list of interview ques-
tions for potential participants. But semistructured interviews are inher-
ently emergent, reflexive, and messy, and the planned focus of an interview
can easily shift as new issues and accounts emerge. Like all diligent re-
searchers, we cautioned potential participants in the information letters
that an interview could take unexpected turns and that new questions
might arise as girls’ narratives raised new substantive or theoretical issues.
The ethics committees were satisfied that we had fulfilled our ethical
obligations and provided full, complete, and accurate information about
the research, but we were less convinced. At best, our warning provided
a predication of what might happen during an interview. At worst, our
assurances were deceptive because they created an illusion of a certainty
that we could not guarantee.
The matter of voluntary, noncoercive consent proved trickier than we
had imagined. The clinics we planned to recruit through were enthusiastic
about the research, but we were advised that institutional ethics clearance
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and approval to recruit participants would only be granted if the clinicians
were coinvestigators in the study. This edict, it was explained, was non-
negotiable and necessary on the grounds that the girls were under clinical
care and the clinicians would protect the girls’ interests.
This unexpected requirement created an awkward political predicament
by compromising our position as independent researchers who worked in
(rather than with) clinics, and put at risk our capacity to report findings
that might be critical of the clinics and/or clinical practice. Another,
shorter stalemate ensued while we discussed how to handle this unex-
pected turn. We could take the moral high ground and refuse to comply
with the institutional requirements. Or we could comply and hope to
“manage” the situation. Or we could try to negotiate a different arrange-
ment. Option 1 (the moral high ground) seemed likely to lead to our
being excluded from the clinics and would seriously threaten the feasibility
of the research. Option 2 (compliance) meant collaborating with the cli-
nicians and raised a bevy of uncertainties. Option 3 (negotiation) seemed
hopeful but reckless. Colleagues urged us to comply, explaining that the
clinicians were busy (men) who would not interfere if we were agreeable
and cooperative. Rather than follow this advice and set aside our moral
concerns or abandon the potentially positive outcomes of the study, we
decided to negotiate. There were lengthy, sometimes tense, but ultimately
successful discussions with the clinicians. Together we developed a strategy
to minimize the compromises to the study by agreeing that the original
team would be responsible for the project design and implementation,
and that we would work together to review the data analysis and to develop
ways to use girls’ perspectives and accounts to inform and to improve
clinical practice. The alliance has been productive and mutually supportive
and has resulted in valuable changes in clinical practice.
The positive outcome to our political quandary did not remove the
implications for participants that might flow from an alliance with the
clinicians. A precondition of informed consent is that it is voluntarily and
freely given. The concept of free will is premised on an autonomous liberal
humanist subject who is able to make rational and independent judgments
regardless of her context. Here the ontological difficulties are the pre-
sumption of a stable, decontextualized subject and the discounting of the
multiple power relations that work visibly and invisibly to constitute the
subject and her interaction with others (Foucault 1977, 1988). We wor-
ried whether genuine informed consent was possible given the clinicians’
connection with the research. To what extent could girls exercise agency
given their subordinate position in the world they cohabited with the
clinicians? As patients, might the girls read the clinicians’ association with
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the study as coercive or as an inappropriate incentive to participate? Would
girls resist participating in the study to irk the physicians or attribute
greater importance to participating out of a misplaced perception that it
might please their doctors? Would the girls hesitate to share their stories
given the clinicians’ involvement? Could girls feel able to voice concerns
about their treatment given their subordination to the doctors’ authority
in the clinic?
The third obligation under the principle of informed consent is to
provide information about the potential for psychological distress or dis-
comfort. The risk of distress is generally considered minimal when the
probability and magnitude of harm are not greater “than those ordinarily
encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine physical
or psychological examinations or tests” (Santelli et al. 1995, 274). Yet
how individuals experience distress can be uncertain and disguised, and
predicting the potential for distress can be difficult (Latvala, Janhonen,
and Moring 1998). Although a growing body of evidence suggests that
qualitative research poses little risk of distress and that telling your story
to an interested listener has emotional and therapeutic value (Kleinman
1988; Corbin and Morse 2003), the individual histories of anorexic girls
suggested that the interviews might revive distressing, secreted traumas.
These girls were more likely than the general population to have expe-
rienced stressful life events such as the death of a close relative or family
breakup or to have experienced depression, low self-esteem, and concerns
about identity and control. Clinical literature has postulated relationships
between anorexia and a range of family problems, including enmeshed,
critical, or coercive family environments; insecure attachment; and physical
and sexual abuse in families (see Polivy and Herman 2002 for a review).
Although some of this research has been questioned (e.g., Eisler 1995),
we could not ignore the possibility that the biographies of some girls
might encompass complex, difficult family relationships. Nor could we
ignore the possibility that distress might be triggered by the accumulation
of painful experiences associated with self-starvation: multiple, long-term
hospital admissions; repeated, failed clinical interventions; physical self-
harm, including attempted suicide; and extended separation from edu-
cation, work, friendships, and social interaction.
Given the biography of self-starvation, even distributing an interview
protocol in the interest of informed consent carried the possibility of
resurrecting upsetting or deeply troubling past memories. Yet ethics policy
and privacy legislation prevented us from accessing information that might
tell us about the best way of interacting with particular participants. Given
the situated chronicles of girls’ lives, we worried that acquiescing to a
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“one-size-fits-all” strategy abdicated our moral and social responsibilities
to our potential participants.
Self-starvation also problematizes the question of competence to pro-
vide informed consent. Under Australian law, young people under the age
of majority are considered competent to participate in research without
parental consent if they understand the procedures and implications of
research. Relevant to any decision about waiving parental consent is the
level of risk involved in the research (Brooks-Gunn and Rotheram-Borus
1994; Levine 1995; Rew, Taylor-Seehafer, and Thomas 2000). In practice,
ethics committees set nominal ages at which they consider adolescents
capable of independently consenting to participate in research. Each of
the ethics committees involved with our multisite study set different age
barriers for consent, ranging from fourteen to sixteen years.
Age barriers for adolescent consent have been hotly contested (e.g.,
Brooks-Gunn and Rotheram-Borus 1994; Brody and Waldron 2000).
Research indicates that young people (fourteen years and older) have a
capacity to understand research and make decisions similar to that of adults
(Meade and Slesnick 2002) but may be affected by lack of experience or
by emotionality (Dorn, Susman, and Fletcher 1995) and have trouble
understanding the different goals of therapy and research (Brody and
Waldron 2000). Some evidence also indicates that acute malnutrition can
cause temporary cognitive impairment and that anorexic patients below
a certain weight are unable to participate effectively in treatment (e.g.,
Bruch 1988) or, by implication, to provide informed consent. The capacity
of adolescents to reason and to make decisions about the risks and benefits
of participating in research can also be limited by stress. Hospitalization
and the physical and psychological symptoms of anorexia can be stressful,
and anorexics have a higher than average likelihood of experiencing prob-
lems like anxiety disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorders, and depression
that can inhibit the ability to make informed choices about participating
in research. These considerations may not be relevant in every case of self-
starvation, but the different age limits set by ethics committees obliged
us to treat all potential participants under the age of sixteen years (the
maximum, nominal age limit identified by our ethics committees) as lack-
ing decision-making capacity and needing parental protection and consent
to participate in research.
Parental consent, however, is not a panacea for the ethical difficulties
of consent. The tacit assumption underpinning the idea of parental consent
is that parents know what is in the best interests of their daughters and
are capable of protecting their interests. Parents, however, are likely to be
positioned in similar power relations as their daughters with regard to the
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medical team and could be influenced to provide consent by a hope that
participating in the research could help their daughters (Brody and Wald-
ron 2000). Although the imbrication of families in self-starvation is a
complex and contested area, difficult family relationships or histories could
affect the decision of some parents to give or to withhold consent. Parental
consent is a double-edged sword, protecting some girls and erasing other
girls’ potential for agency by increasing the opportunity for parental
coercion.
We presented our case for relinquishing age barriers and parental con-
sent to the institutional ethics officers, but they advised that all ethics
committees were immovable on these issues. The concern was not with
the legitimacy of the arguments we presented but with the financial threat
of a litigious parent or caregiver. With no option but to acquiesce on this
count, we circumvented the restrictions imposed by our committees by
using a different form of consent involving “ongoing consensual decision-
making” (Ramos 1989, 60) before, during, and after the interviews so
that participants had repeated opportunities to withdraw or to qualify
consent. This strategy could not guarantee the knowability of informed
consent or obviate unseen power relations, but it offered a greater degree
of empowerment by providing girls with multiple opportunities to qualify
and negotiate their involvement in the research.
II. Ethics in our narrative
The knotty problem of universalism and the essentialized subject
The ethics framework that regulates Western research and guides the de-
cision making of ethics committees is based on the concept of a univer-
salized rational subject and an ethic of justice derived from Kantian moral
theory. The presumption of the universalized subject takes for granted
that the experiences of the dominant social group can be generalized and
taken as true for all others. In this frame, consensus about moral behavior
and ethical practice is unproblematic because all rational subjects will
acknowledge that the agreed universal moral principles are in the interests
of all subjects.
Research ethics policy combines Kantian rationalism with the social
contract theories of liberal philosophers like Thomas Hobbes, John Locke,
and John Rawls. In the contractarian model of social relations any ethical
and moral problem can be resolved by using the liberal principles of
equality, fairness, and reciprocity, and a public system of rights and re-
sponsibilities in the form of laws, procedures, and protocols (Benhabib
1987, 85). Margaret Walker describes the progeny of Kantian rationalism
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and social contract theory as the theoretical-juridical model of ethical
theory, comprising “a set of law-like moral principles or procedures” that
are transhistorical, transcultural, and couched in the language of scientific
objectivity to appear dispassionate and authorative (1997, 36).
Ethics committees grew out of a positivist tradition of biomedical re-
search that evolved in tandem with the theoretical-juridical model of
ethics. Positivist research takes for granted the existence of a putative
knowable reality, and that objective, universal truths can be revealed
through empirical scientific data collection and explicit, transparent, ex-
perimental research operations and procedures (Harre and Secord 1972).
The conceptual foundation of positivism has been widely challenged, but
its assumptions continue to underpin the philosophy and processes em-
bedded in regulatory frameworks for research ethics, particularly when
biomedical agencies have an influential role in developing and monitoring
ethics policy and practice.
The positivist biomedical model of research ethics has had exceptional
discursive power and has been taken up and imposed on disciplines such
as the social sciences and humanities, even when these disciplines employ
radically different epistemic frames and forms of data collection and anal-
ysis. The widespread infiltration of the positivist model of research ethics
has worked to visibly and invisibly inscribe the management, surveillance,
and control of research ethics in ways that appear natural, benign, and
eminently reasonable to “any rational subject.” Most researchers accept
the requirement (if not the desirability) of ethics review before research
commences. Yet the biomedical model also casts research ethics in a shroud
of scientific neutrality and universal certainty that crafts an illusion that
ethics approval means ethical research, begetting a compliance approach
to research ethics and to the ways that researchers think through ethical
questions.
The presumption of a universalized, rational subject that is at the heart
of Kantian moral theory and modern research ethics policy is inherently
problematic because it constructs the self as disembedded and disembod-
ied, without sensibilities, history, or physicality. All research projects face
the challenge of finding the “generalized subject” who describes the re-
search population. The theoretical and practical difficulties of this task are
rarely openly paraded and discussed, and the task is rarely as problematic
as in our narrative. Fewer difficulties arise, for example, in defining the
population for a research project about the life histories of “schoolgirls.”
But the embodiment of self-starvation is both profound and ambiguous;
different discourses attach conflicting meanings to the anorexic body (and
mind), and the biography of self-starvation is singular and diverse at the
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same time. Our experiences highlighted the difficulties of constructing a
definitive, universal category of the anorexic subject and threw into sharp
relief the illusion of the universal subject of Kantian discourse.
The problems of consent illuminated the gulf between the embodied
singularity of research participants and the disembodied, humanist subject
of the ethic of justice and positivist research. An amalgam of legal edicts
(e.g., privacy legislation) and local practices by ethics committees (e.g.,
prohibition of any contact between researchers and participants before
written consent is given) curtail researchers’ capacity to engage with and
learn about research participants before beginning the research. These
constraints were designed to protect participants and to prevent coercion.
At the same time, they prevent researchers and potential participants from
developing the personal relationships that make it possible to address the
diverse singularity of research participants in the design of a research
project and in research ethics protocols.
Erasing the singularity of research participants has grave moral impli-
cations. Public conversations about self-starvation, the anorexic body, and
the anorexic subject have been dominated by voices of doctors, psychol-
ogists, medical researchers, sociologists, and feminists. Following Carol
Gilligan (1982) and Sandra Harding (1987), a primary aim of our study
was to bring girls’ standpoints into these public discussions and to open
up new theoretical possibilities by hearing the voices and silences smoth-
ered by the conversations of others. The definition of the research pop-
ulation offered to our ethics committees satisfied their expectations and
requirements, but it narrowed the research focus by excluding a range of
potential participants (e.g., girls who rejected their diagnosis) and
(re)configured the study’s aim to illuminate the diversity among all “an-
orexic” teenage girls. The result was a disconcerting paradox: the act of
defining the research population erased the particular and individual dif-
ferences among potential participants, ignoring “the plurality of modes
of being human, and differences among humans” (Benhabib 1987, 81)
and, in doing so, disregarded one of the four fundamental principles of
humanist research ethics policy—respect for persons.
Power, politics, and the embodiment of self and “others”
Power and politics are inextricably entwined with research ethics. The
legal requirement to receive ethics committee approval to conduct research
in ways that are acceptable to ethics committees (and to ethics officers)
explicitly subordinates researchers to the authority of research committees.
The ethics approval process also creates a hierarchical power relationship
between researchers and participants when it constructs researchers as
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objective, dispassionate scientists with the knowledge and expertise to
reveal “truths” about their research “subjects.” Bestowing such an identity
positions researchers as superior to their participants, who become the
less knowledgeable, passive “objects” of the research and of the researcher.
In the case of anorexia, assigning a differential status to researchers and
participants through the ethics process replicates the power relations, pol-
itics, and public discourses that disempower anorexic girls by constituting
self-starvation as different, deviant, and other. When researchers acquiesce
to the requirements and interpretations imposed by ethics committees,
they are drawn into a position that is vulnerable to perpetuating and
reinscribing the hegemonic discourses and practices that construct ano-
rexic girls as other. In this way, the ethics process reconfigures the aim of
the research in unintended ways and overlooks questions of moral and
ethical responsibility to research subjects in favor of conformity with nor-
mative protocols and practices.
Historically, feminists have directed their attention to the colonizing
power of discourses about gender, race, and class and to the ways these
subjugate and exclude particular groups by constituting them as other.
For feminists, the priority has been to show how discourses and practices
usurp the rights and capacities of “others” to speak (and act) for themselves
by authorizing different voices (e.g., fathers, politicians, lawyers and
courts, welfare agencies) to speak in their stead. In Australia, Aboriginal
Australians, historically the nation’s most marginalized social group, have
fought hard to be recognized and to be appointed to research ethics
committees so that indigenous people have a say in research ethics. Our
experiences illuminate the extent to which the ethics process constructs
and silences individuals and social groups, and the extent to which the
ethics process can shackle researchers’ efforts to interrupt or transform
the conditions that perpetuate the assignation of particular groups as other.
The (im)possibilities of becoming an ethical researcher
The explicit purpose of ethics policy is to summon into being ethical
research and ethical researchers. Yet corridor conversations and conference
banter among researchers are often sprinkled with rumblings about ethics
committees. A common complaint is that the ethics approval process is
an intrusive, onerous obligation that delays (or obstructs) the “real” work
of research. In such conversations, ethics committees and researchers are
invariably positioned as binary opposites: powerful versus powerless, dic-
tatorial versus subjugated, rigid and dogmatic versus flexible and respon-
sive, methodologically ignorant versus methodologically knowledgeable.
Reflective ethics and moral action are forestalled when researchers see
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“ethics” as a barrier, rather than a facilitator, to ethical research. Re-
searchers’ discomfort with the ways that ethics processes can position
researchers as other than ethical is evidenced by the imperative researchers
feel to find new ways of doing ethical research—implementing post hoc
strategies to circumvent difficulties with prescribed ethics procedures,
abandoning research that cannot “fit” the rules or interpretations of ethics
committees, constructing elaborate justifications for processes that deviate
from the interpretation of ethics policy by local committees, or paying
only lip service to the ethics review process.
We incorporated strategies in our recruitment and consent procedures
to try to address our complicity in the othering of anorexic girls. In itself,
this act illustrates the moral circularity of trying to be ethical researchers
and comply with the protocols of ethics policy and practice. Developing
consent processes that were morally responsive to the singularity of self-
starvation meant thinking outside the existing protocols, endeavoring to
connect with relational sensibility to the concrete “otherness” of the girls
who might be in our study, and then recrafting our understanding of the
girls in a realist epistemology and language that fit the ethics regulations
and the expectations of our ethics committees. Although our ethics com-
mittees endorsed the outcome, we were struck by the irony that the
intellectual work of caring about participants within an ethic of justice
involved (momentarily) relinquishing all conceptual links with formal
ethics procedures and expectations.
The positivist biomedical model casts research ethics as a decontex-
tualized set of principles and procedures for all scenarios, in which re-
searchers are seen as disembodied and dispassionate scientists who are
disengaged and removed from the ethics process. Yet our narrative showed
that research ethics is deeply embedded and implicated in the social con-
text. Factors like project timelines, the requirements of funding bodies,
the local practices of different ethics committees, personal relationships
in the research setting and with ethics officers and committees, and ethics
committees’ anxiety about litigation all play a potent, if sometimes mute,
role in decisions about ethics. Researchers are embodied in the ethical
process: meeting and negotiating with ethics officers and others in the
research setting; refining the research design to address ethical issues;
writing and rewriting ethics applications; and wrestling with decisions that
kindle an array of intersecting emotions, including discomfort, anxiety,
relief, anticipation, optimism, and hope. The practice of decontextualizing
and disembodying ethics occludes the investments researchers bring to
“getting through” the ethics process and the role these processes can play
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in privileging particular voices and eroding the relationship between par-
ticipants and researchers.
Our narrative foregrounds some of the tensions researchers encounter
in trying to take up an identity as an ethical researcher in a regulated
framework of research ethics. The rigid prescription or interpretation of
ethics policy can affect the design of research, undermining its value and
nurturing inadequate or even poor research. Nor does compliance with the
edicts of ethics committees guarantee moral decision making or moral ac-
tion. Derrida (1990) cautions that unqualified compliance with laws and
regulations creates the very thing they were designed to avert: people re-
lating to each other instrumentally. The ethics approval process confronts
a similar difficulty because it is “designed in terms of the greatest good for
the greatest number. [The ethics process is] useful to refer to, but [it is]
not necessarily humane or even just in every situation because [it] perpet-
uate[s] tension between the universal and the particular” (Byrne Armstrong
and Horsfall, forthcoming).
Our experiences suggest that research ethics policy and processes pro-
vide guidance but not definitive solutions to questions about ethical re-
search and moral behavior. Rather, formulaic rules and practices are vul-
nerable to nurturing unethical and amoral behaviors whereby researchers
pay lip service to the ethics approval process knowing they have committed
to processes that are conceptually flawed or impossible to implement. In
such a climate, the ethics process fosters deception and cultures of coun-
terfeit practice, destroying the very thing it seeks to create: ethical research.
Dreaming the (im)possible dream: Imagining future possibilities
The epistemic tensions between the discourses of the universal, rational
subject of scientific realism and those of the multidimensional, particular,
and social subject of interpretative, qualitative research create messy moral
dilemmas. Despite the advances of recent decades, feminist research strad-
dles a prickly divide in trying to craft research to fit ethics policies and
practices when ethics committees employ a biomedical model of research
and when dialogue between researchers and ethics committees is con-
strained.
Rather than succumb to the normalizing power of the ethics process,
feminists have challenged the notion of research ethics as a codelike set
of rules that regulates moral action (e.g., Gilligan 1977; Benhabib 1992),
and researchers have urged reform of the processes for approving quali-
tative research (Parker 1990; Corbin and Morse 2003). Some ethics com-
mittees have developed more sophisticated, flexible understandings of in-
2158 ❙ Halse and Honey
terpretive research practice, often as a result of struggles over the kinds
of issues we raise and by appointing knowledgeable practitioners of in-
terpretive research to ethics committees. Yet many committees continue
to use the same criteria to judge interpretative and positivist research,
reluctant to relinquish the (illusionary) comfort that complying with re-
search ethics means ethical research (see Corbin and Morse 2003,
335–36).
Feminists have challenged Kantian rationalism as a basis for ethical and
moral action and proposed an ethic of care and responsibility as an al-
ternative to the universal subject and the explicit separation of self and
others embedded in an ethic of justice. Gilligan (1977) has argued that
an ethic of care involves fundamentally different moral concepts than an
ethic of justice. It comprises a morality based on responsibility and rela-
tionships rather than rights and rules, is grounded in concrete circum-
stances rather than abstractions, and is expressed as an “activity of care”
rather than as a set of rules.
Despite the challenges posed in our narratives, we are reluctant to
relinquish the idea of an ethics approval process given the long history of
researchers denying, abusing, or sacrificing the rights and interests of
subjects in the name of knowledge, science, and research. We are also
hesitant about an ethic of care in the absence of a moral framework. Such
a model presumes the knowability of the “other”; is susceptible to being
reduced to a vague, unruly form of empathy; and, as Joan Tronto (1999,
113) points out, makes a claim for a morality based on subjectivity that
is vulnerable to relativism or solipsism.
Feminists have proposed that discourse ethics offers a way forward
through a morality based on the interdependence of a care ethic and
justice, whereby specific cases and claims in particular contexts can be
considered within a framework of moral principles (Benhabib 1992). Such
an approach would draw on justice principles to guide decision making
but would accommodate multiple epistemologies; consider the specificity
of individual cases in particular contexts; take both difference and a sen-
sibility to the embedded and embodied particularity of participants and
researchers as central to ethical decision making; include processes to
encourage and nurture dialogue among researchers, participants, and
ethics committees; and constitute ethics as an ongoing process of critical
reflection, action, and accountability throughout the research rather than
as an act of compliance and approval at the beginning of the research.
In our vague imaginings—our partial dream—the research ethics process
would become an ongoing collaborative process shaped by dialogue and
responsive relationships that are guided (but not dictated) by principles of
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justice. Thinking of research ethics as a continual process of collaboration
would open up opportunities to dissolve the (mis)conception that ethics
approval means ethical research; to erase the differential power relationships
among researchers, ethics committees, and participants; and to interrupt
the mechanisms that make researchers and research complicit in the “oth-
ering” of research participants.
III. Conclusion
The aim of our narratives is to make visible, and therefore revisable, the
dilemmas that surround research ethics policies and their implementation
by ethics committees and the implications these carry for research partic-
ipants and for researchers. The multiple constitutions of self-starvation
and the embedded and embodied diversity of “anorexic” girls erase the
assumptions that a research population is a homogenous constituency and
that informed consent is a conceptually coherent or morally painless act.
Rather, the universal, rational subject of an ethic of justice is an illusionary
desire, and complying with research ethics processes does not necessarily
mean that the ethics processes respect the singularity of participants. Our
narratives illuminate how sensibility to power relations, biographical path-
ways and life experiences, and the identities of the researchers and par-
ticipants—the “others” of ethics policy—can be obliterated in a compli-
ance model of research ethics and how the research context and
institutional structures and practices can fashion ethical decisions and
moral actions that curtail sensitivity to “others” and constrain the pos-
sibility and practice of feminist research.
The dual aims of research ethics policy are to respect and protect re-
search participants, on the one hand, and to cultivate ethical researchers,
on the other. Yet when prescribed ethics protocols fail to engage with the
concrete lives and work of participants and researchers, the policy and
practice of research ethics functions to construct both researchers and
participants as contrary to, different from, and other to its aims. Our
narratives illuminate that writing an application for ethics committee re-
view is not a simple or straightforward process. It entangles researchers
in tricky moral decisions around complying with the ethics process, ap-
pearing to be an ethical researcher, and being an ethical researcher. The
decision making involved in preparing ethics applications positions re-
searchers in an awkward moral space between compliance and defiance,
legal and transgressive action, instrumentality and sensibility to others. In
this space, the rules are unclear, but the moral risks are high.
We do not aim or pretend to offer a definitive solution to the concerns
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raised in our narratives. Nor do we underestimate the difficulties of trans-
forming established, institutionalized ethics processes, particularly if there
are vested interests in protecting and preserving the status quo. Our point
is political. Despite advances in the theorizing and practice of feminist
research, it is easy to underestimate or to fail to see the ways in which
the social, organizational, and cultural practices of the research ethics
process work as conceptual and concrete barriers that impede feminist
research approaches and position feminist researchers in ideologically un-
comfortable spaces. It is equally easy to underestimate the extent to which
we, knowingly and unknowingly, take up locations in these uncomfortable
spaces and, in doing so, become complicit in preserving the very things
our work seeks to erode.
Foucault argued that ethics is not based on or constrained by any legal
or religious system but evolves from reflectivity and is indivisible from the
self and an aesthetic of existence (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982). The formal
conventions of the ethics review process do not exempt researchers from
sensibility to the particular, embedded, and embodied “others” or from
doing the intellectual work of reflexively analyzing the ethics and morality
of their decisions or actions. Nor do they erase the political imperative
for feminist researchers to lead the way in developing better processes for
ethical decision making and moral action in research.
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